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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JESSE P. HANSON,
Plaintiff and Respond enf,

)

-vs.\,

GENERAL BUILDERS SUPPLY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and STEPHEN G. KNIGHT,
Defendarnts and Appellants.

(

Case
No. 9884

)

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent considers the Statement of Facts in
appellant's brief to be incomplete, and to assist the
Court in considering the points raised in appellant's brief
and hereinaftre discussed \Ve are summarizing the facts
as follows:
On August 31, 1960, at about 11:30 a.m., the plaintiff was stopped in the left-turn lane facing east at the
intersection of 21st South and State Street. He was driving a one-half ton Dodge pickup truck. (R. 42, 43) The light
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was red, and he was stopped jut before the crosswalk in
the lane reserved for left turn only. After the collision
he was knocked forward about 15 or 20 feet beyond the
crosswalk so that his vehicle was knocked forward about
25 or 30 feet by the impact of defendant's truck. (R. 45,
46) Plaintiff's truck was completely stopped at the time
collision occurred and had been stopped for at least 30
seconds, ... or ma.ybe a little longer." His turn signals
were on, and his brake lights were in operating condition
at the time he stopped. ( R. 47)
At the scene of the collision, the truck dri\'er stated
that his brakes failed and he couldn't stop. (R. 48)
The hinges were broken off of the end-gate of the
plaintiff's truck, and there was damage to the tail-light
and fender. (R. 50) Plaintiff's truck had a heavy angle
bar welded across the back and under the frame and at the
end of the frame to support the towbar attachment, and
this heavy bar extended all the way out even \\'ith the
end gate of the truck, and this angle iron was so situated
on plaintiff's truck as to prevent a forcible impact from
doing further damage to his truck. (R. 116, 117)
Plaintiff was probably 20 feet or so from the intersection when the light changed to red. Plaintiff ·was the
first car there and was right at the crosswalk. (R. 159)
The defendant, Stephen G. !{night, testified that he
had a Class A chauffeur's license which permitted him
to drive big trucks and that the truck he was driving, at
2
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the time of the collision, was a 1950 ton-and-a-half flatbed Ford. (R. 171)
He was making a delivery on behalf of the defendant
corporation but did not remember where he was going,
but he was driving easterly on 21st South at about 11 :30
in the morning when the accident occurred. (R. 172)
He did not remember the route he took except that he had
come from 255 West 27th South. He testified as follows:
''I was going east, as you say, up 21st South.
Upon coming up to the intersection, I was going
to stop; I knew this. I applied my foot-brake.
There was no response, so I pumped it; still nothing; and I applied the hand-brake, which did slo'v
me down; and that was when I ran into ~Ir. Hanson." (R. 173)
The defendant claimed he was traveling approximately 5 miles an hour when he struck Mr. Hanson's
truck, and prior to that he was traveling approximately
30 miles an hour. (R. 173)
He did not recall seeing any other cars ahead of
Mr. Hanson. The front end of defendant's truck was still
in the crosswalk after the impact. (R. 174)
He- had previously driven this 1950 Ford on occasion.
It was used for incidental deliveries. He had not noticed
anything unusual about the brakes prior to the time he
applied the brakes before contact with the plaintiff's
truck. (R. 176) He had no recollection of a brake application after leaving the yard up to the time of the accident. (R. 177) The General Builder's Supply had about
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eight newer trucks than the old model 1950 which was
involved in the collision and the defendant Knight had
driven this 1950 truck a' few times before the accident
occurred. The truck generally was used for the delivery
of merchandise to various areas in the ecity. Newer
trucks in the yard were preferred to the use of the old
one. (R. 180) He did not think the 1950 truck was as easy
to operate as the newer ones. He did not remember testing the brakes of the truck as he was driving it in the
ya,rd on, the morning of the accident, and for all he knew
at the trial or knew at the time of the collision, the brakes
on the truck could have been defective before he ever took
it out of the yard. (R. 181)
The witness had been driving since 1956. He had had
two years of driving experience with the defendant corporation. He had had frequent occasion, because of the
proximity of General Builders Supply to the intersection
of 21st South and State Street, to drive through that intersection prior to the accident and was thoroughly familiar with it. He knew of the semaphore controls, the
area of the left-turn lane, and the usual condition of traffic
at 11:30 in the morning. (R. 181, 182)
He had no recollection whether he saw the plaintiff's
truck moving before he struck it, and as far as he knew,
the plaintiff's truck could have been completely stopped
when the defendant Knight first saw it. He did not recall which lane was occupied by the plaintiff's truck. He
did not recall whether he was intending to make a deliYery
northerly up State Street on that morning. The left-turn
lane on the west side of the intersection of 21st South is
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for vehicles that intend to make a left-turn only. (R.
183) He had no explanation for the presence of his truck
in the left~turn lane. (R. 184)
The red dotted line on Exhibit 1 represents the approximate location of the defendant's truck in the crosswalk after the impact, according to the defendant Knight,
except that he can't remember which lane he was in. He
could not be sure what caused him to apply the foot
brake on his truck, whether it was the plaintiff's truck or
the light. (R. 186) At the time he was applying his
brakes he didn't know whether the light was green or
whether it was red, and he doesn't remember whether he
saw the plaintiff's truck before he applied the brakes or
not. He did not believe there were any other vehicles
ahead of him stopped at the intersection to the right of
plaintiff's truck that would have prevented him from
proceeding straight ahead if he had been in the southernmost lane. He did not believe there were any vehicles
ahead of them. (R. 187)
In his deposition which was taken sometime prior to
the trial, the defendant Knight testified as follows.
'' Q. Now, what was the occasion for trying to
stop; was it the presence of Mr. Hanson in front
of you or the change in the traffic light that
prompted you to start trying to stop?

"A. It would have been the light."
Then, on the next page :

"Q. In other words, )'On observed the light had
turned red and you started to try and stop the
forward movement of your truck?

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''A. Yes.
'' Q. In doing so, your brakes had failed~

''A. Yes.
"Do you recall so testifying on that occasion~
''A. Yes, on that occasion.
'' Q. So, at that time, you testified that it was
the red light which prompted you to attempt to
apply your brakes; and, today, you have testified
that you didn't know whether it was the light or
the truck in head of you; is that correct~

''A. Yes.

"Q. Are you in a position to tell us, after being
refreshed by your deposition, which was the more
likely reason for your first application of brakes?
''A. Been the light.

"Q. And, I take it, that you have no recollection
of ever seeing Mr. Hanson's truck until the actual impact occurred~
"A. Yes." (R. 188-189).
The witness Staley testified that he operated the
Second West Garage R. 190), and he worked on maintenance of trucks as his specialty, and in that connection
took care of the repair and service work for General
Builders Supply trucks. (R. 191)
The witness identified Exhibit 16 as representing a
work record on the defendant's 1950 model Ford truck.
The exhibit is undated, but job sheets bearing a number
before and after, with numbers of 1155 and 1192 indi'
cate that the work may have been done between JulY i
. '
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1960, and July 12, 1960, inasmuch as the witness kept a
numerical sequence on his work sheets. (R. 194, 195, 196)
The witness could not explain why the date appearing on Exhibit 16 was written in ink while the rest ·was
written in carbon, and the witness does not know who
put that date on. It was usual for the date to be ·written
in at the time the work order was prepared. (R. 197)
Exhibit 16 contains the notation: ''Change oil; the
oil cartridge. Tighten bed, repair lights, tighten front
spring, and repair signal lights; install front rear spring
pin. Adjust brakes." (R. 199)
This work was done by the witness Staley. On crossexamination he stated that the $12.50 on the Exhibit coYered everything, and when asked what portion of the labor charge was for the adjustment of the brakes: '' Oh,
I'd say a good dollar and a half; dollar, seventy-five."
(R. 200) He did not take the brake down to inspect the
lining. He did not know what condition the lining of the
brake was in at the time of this brake adjustment. He
thought the lining was good in May of 1960, although he
could not recall to what extent the lining was worn in
jlay. The repair that he took only 20 minutes on was just
a superficial adjustment of what brake was there, and
the witness had no way of telling the extent the truck had
been used between ~[ay and the time of his adjustment.
(R. 200, 201)
The witness does all the service work for General
Builders Supply trucks and has done for five years. He
desired to continue repairing their trucks. (R. 201)
7
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PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
The force of the impact injured plaintiff's neck seriously and painfully. He supported his head and neck
when he got out of the truck with his hand. He was dazed
by the impact, but received no injury other than the injury to his neck. ( R. 49)
After delivering the transmission which was in his
truck, the plaintiff went home and lay down all that day
and was still experiencing pain and discomfort in his
neck. (R. 51) Plaintiff could not move his head and had
terrific headaches. The pain in his neck was a sharp,
cutting pain. Plaintiff's wife applied heat to his neck,
which seemed to help some, but the pain was worse the
next day. (R. 52) The following day, plaintiff remained
in bed the biggest part of the day. (R. 53)
The pain and stiffness in his neck and pain on attempts to move it continued. For three months he could
hardly move his head at all, and he went to a chiropractor
for treatment. (R. 53). The visit to the chiropractor was
about 10 days after the collision, and the chiropractor
advised him to see a bone specialist or a doctor. On about
September 15th, plaintiff went to Dr. Owen Reese, who
examined him and gave him a drug prescription to relieve
the pain. At that time, plaintiff could not moYe his head.
(R. 54, 55)
About two weeks later he made another visit to Dr.
Reese and X-rays were taken. Dr. Reese gave him some
sort of electrical treatment which did not give him much
8
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relief. Plaintiff was then referred to Dr. Boyd Holbrook,
an orthopedic specialist. (R. 56) His condition at the time
he went to see Dr. Holbrook was about the same, and it
remained about the same for over a year without much
change, impairing plaintiff's ability and giving him pain
whenever he tried to turn. This pain and disability continues up to the present time. (R. 57)
About three months after the collision, plaintiff went
to his garage to check the books and bills as he does his
own bookkeeping and keeps his own records. (R. 58)
Prior to the collision, plaintiff spent at least two-thirds
of his working in overalls in his shop along with the other
men working on cars in the shop, and one-third of the
time taking care of the business. (R. 59) He received a
certificate as "Doctor of Motors" from the Perfect Circle
l\1anufacturing Company, which was one of the outstanding awards of the nation as an auto mechanic. Plaintilff is trained to do all kinds of auto repair. It was
about a year after the accident before plaintiff could do
any car repair at all, and then his work had been restricted to minor jobs- tune-ups and work which would
not require him to get down under a car. It is now impossible for him to get under the dash of a car to fix any
of the wires or change the gauges because he can't hold
his head underneath. Plaintiff can't get under the car
and take down a transmission. Plaintiff is unable to do
any work '' ... where I have to be laying down or looking
up under, where I have to hold my head in a horizontal
position, or something of that type.'' He can tune up a
motor or overhaul a carburetor, and can put in a new set
9
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of points and set the timing, and put in blocks. It was
at least a year after the accident before he started even to
do that. (R. 60, 61) If there is a tune-up job in his garage, or if they have a job he can do, he does it; if they
don't, then he doesn't. He usually works four or five
hours a day if there is that kind of work to be done. He
has had to employ another mechanic for two or three
hours a day, four days a week, since about one year before the trial. (R. 62) He also hired another mechanic
part-time during the year 1961 for about four hours a
day, four days a week. (R. 63)
Plaintiff's wife gives him heat treatments and has
made him a big flannel scarf which he always puts around
his neck, and he wore a collar prescribed by Dr. Holbrook,
which he wore constantly for two or three months. (R. 64)
There has been little or no improvement in the condition of plaintiff's neck for a considerable period of time,
and prior to the collision on August 31, 1960, he had no
problems in connection with his neck. He had never
been unable to perform his work because of pain in his
neck prior to the collision, and he had never seen a doctor in connection with injuries, nor had he been involved
in an accident in which his neck was injured at all; he was
not aware that he had any arthritic problem in his neck
at all. Prior to August 31, 1960, he had not suffered any
restriction of movement in his neck and was able to perform all of the work of a mechanic in and about an automobile or a truck without pain or discomfort to his neck.
(R. 65, 66)
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Plaintiff is 63 years old and has been an automobile mechanic for 45 years. (R. 131)
Plaintiff's son helped him an average of 13 or 20
hours a week up until Christmas of 1960 for a period of
approximately 4 months (R. 166), and since 1960 and up
to the time of the trial the son has worked for his father
from 8 to 10 hours a week without making any charge.
(R. 168)
Dr. Owen G. Reese testified that he first saw the
plaintiff on September 19, 1960. (R. 69) At that time, the
plaintiff had a stiff and painful neck with limitation of
motion side to side and in a rotated manner of about 50
per cent, and he had about 80 per cent restriction of
flexion and extension. ( R. 70). There was also extreme
tenderness of the musculature of the back of the neck,
which was definitely in spasm. (R. 70-A).
The X-ray showed the patient to have a pre-existing
osteoarthritis, not related to the accident. (R. 74) Dr.
Reese testified, in answer to the hypothetical question
based upon the evidence (R. 76, 77), that, in his opinion,
the accident was wholly and solely responsible for the
plaintiff's condition when the witness saw him. (R. 78).
Dr. Reese, noting that soft tissue whiplash injuries usually heal within a year, expressed the opinion that hi8 disability was permanent. (R. 79)
Dr. Reese described his findings, with respect to
limitation of motion, as being objective and not based
upon the subjective complaints of the plaintiff. (R. 84)
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Dr. Reese testified that the osteoarthritis was not responsible for plaintiff's limitation of motion and was not consistent with it, in his opinion. (R. 85) Dr. Reese testified
that the 20 per cent permanent disability was due to the
arthritis that had been triggered from plaintiff's injury.
Dr. Boyd Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon for 13
years in Salt Lake City, testified that he first saw the
plaintiff on April 28, 1961, at which time his examination of the plaintiff disclosed marked restriction of the
motion of the neck, moderate tenderness in the lower part
of the neck and at the base of the skull. (R. 93, 94)
Dr. Holbrook saw the plaintiff on November 27, 1962
(about a week before the trial). (R. 96) At that time, his
examin.a.tion. disclosed about 50 per cent loss of motion to
the neck, and there was some tenderness in the neck. This
loss of motion, inrVolved all movements of the neck. He
did not h(J/I)e to rely upon the complaint of the patient.
It was an objective finding. (R. 97)
In answer to the /rypothetical question based upon
the evidence, Dr. Holbrook testified that the symptoms exhibited by the witness were the result of the injury.
(R. 99) He further testified that the plaintiff s·uffered
a permanent injury, and that his permanent disability
was approximately 20 per cent bodily impairment - impa.irment of the body as a whole, as it would be difficult to
think of the neck as functioning separately from the body.
He further testified that this permanent injury would
impair plaintiff's ability to work as a mechanic. He
recommended that the plaintiff have an operation on his
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

neck, which would require hospitalization. (R. 100-101).
This operation would involve removal of the degenerated
disc and installation of a bone plug from the hip bone
and fusion of the vertebrae involved. Dr. Holbrook pointed out the various hazards of such an operation. (R.
102-103)
Dr. II olbrook was of the opinion that the operation
would accomplish a 50 per cent improvement, but it was
possible tha.t the plain,tiff would not obtain any, because
all operations are not successful. Assuming that the 017era.tion wonld be success/ttl, he would still have 10 per
cent permanent body disability after the operation. He
testified that the reasonable cost of such an operation
would be approximately $1,000.00. (R. 105)

When asked if he had an opinion as to whether
there ·was a relationship between the necessity for the
operation and the collision which occurred August 31,
1960, Dr. Holbrook testified that in his opinion the precipitating factor creating the plaintiff's present condition
for which an operation is recommended was the result of
the injury the plaintiff sustained. (R. 106)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT, HAVING MADE NO OBJECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
BY THE TRIAL COURT OR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE
FROM: THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
JURY, CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN OF ERROR
IN THIS RESPECT ON APPEAL.
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court charged the jury as follows in Instruction
No.9 D (R.l3):
"For the purpose of this proceeding, it has
been determined that the defendants are liable for
any injury the plaintiff suffered proximately resulting from the automobile collision in question.
Therefore, you are only required to determine
what injury to the plaintiff, if any, has been so
caused, and the amount of damages, if any, that
plaintiff is entitled to recover as compensation
therefor.
"Such a determination of legal liability should
in no way influence or prejudice you either for or
against the defendants. You should neither punish nor reward the defendant on account of such
determinatj.on. The award you make to the plaintiff should be such sum as you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate him for injury and damage
proximately resulting from the negligence of the
defendant.''
At the conclusion of the instructions to the jury,
counsel for the defendant made the following statement
in the presence of the Trial Court and counsel for the
plaintiff:
''Defendants take no exceptions to the instructions as given by the Court." (R. 206)
This was tantamount to an approval of the Court's
charge removing the issue of negligence from the jury.
At the time that the instructions were given before the
jury returned with their verdict, it was the duty of the
defendants to call to the attention of the trial judge any
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error in the instructions given to which the defendants
objected in order that the Trial Court may have had an
opportunity to consider and weigh the objection and make
appropriate correction if such correction was indicated.
Indeed, this principle is recognized in Rule 51, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which, among other things provides:
''No party may assign as error the giving or
failure to give instructions unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of instructions, a
party must state distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds for his objection."
On several occasions this Court has ruled that it
cannot consider on appeal any error in the instructions of
the trial court to which no exception was taken.
In Patton v. Eva.ns, 92 Utah 524, 69 P.2d 969, the
Court held that where no exceptions were taken the error
in the instructions was not subject to review.
More recently, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah, 2d 266
272, P. 2d 185, the Court said :
''No exceptions were taken to these instructions, nor were they assigned as error in the motion for a new trial. The law as therein declared
at the request of the plaintiff became the law of
the case, especially as far as the plaintiff is concerned ....
•'In order that a party may take advantage of
an error in instructions committed by the trial
court, he must make a proper objection. 53 Am.
Jur. 606. Generally, appellate courts will not revimY a ground of objection not raised in the trial
court. 3 Am. Jur. 116 Appeal and Error 381. The
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duty is incumbent upon counsel to give the trial
court the opportunity to correct the error before
asking the appellate court to review a verdict and
judgment thereon.''
Again, in Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 349,
P .2d 1117, the Court said :
''Error is assigned to the giving of certain instructions to the jury. Many of the objections now
urged on appeal were not urged in the trial court
and thus need not be considered by this court,
there being no showing of special circumstances
why these objections were not made below.''
In McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274, P.2d 962,
the Court said :
"It must be kept in mind that the language just
quoted is not the rule but the exception. Normally
the rules themselves must govern procedure and
are to be followed unless some persuasive reason
to the contrary invokes the discretion of the Court
to extricate a person from a situation where some
gross injustice or inequity would otherwise
result.''
Counsel for the appellant may claim that he argued
error in the Court's ruling the defendants negligent as a
matter of law at the hearing on the motion for a new trial,
but we are unable to perceive how the appellants could
inform the court before verdict that they took no exception to its instructions and then after verdict on a motion
for a new trial, claim error in the instructions which
should induce the trial court to grant a new trial on that
ground.
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For this court to hold otherwise in this case would
require the negation of Rule 51 and the reversal of the
firmly established principles incorporated in the rule.
See also Siegel v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 4 N.E.
2d 805 (Ill.).
In Meadows v. U.S., C.C.A. 4th Circuit, 144 F. 2d
751, the Court said:
"On the second point, as to the charge of the
judge to the jury, the record shows that there
was no objection to the charge at the time it was
made. Objections to the charge of the trial judge
should be called to his attention at the time, and
if this is not done, the objections cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. This rule was laid
down by Taft, C. J., in the case of Brevard Tannin
Co. v. J. F. Moser Co., e tal., 4 Cir., 288 F. 725,
731. In that case, Judge Taft said: 'In the face of
this formidable array of authority from the 2nd,
5th, 6th and 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, we
should be inclined to hold that the exceptions in
this record were not duly reserved and are not
properly before us.' That is, without exception,
the rule in federal courts.''
Nowhere in the record on appeal does it appear that
the appellant has, by appropriate objection or exception,
preserved his right to complain of the trial court's ruling
that the defendants were negligent as a matter of law.
Indeed, counsel for appelants flatly told the Court that he
did not have any exceptions to the instructions given;
17
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and as we review the evidence summarized in the statement of facts pertaining to negligence, it would be remarkable if counsel for the appellants was not himself
fully persuaded at the conclusion of the trial that the
defendants were negligent as a matter of law. At any
rate, it is difficult to perceive how any reasonable person
could have absolved the defendants from the charge of
negligence in view of the record, as it more fully and
clearly will be established in a discussion of the point
which follows :

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE
DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENT AS A ~IATTER
OF LAW.
The appellants assert in their brief that the collision
resulted from a sudden brake failure without prior warning, and the question of negligence in this respect should
have been submitted to the jury. The appellants cite
several cases, all of which are distinguishable from the
case at bar, and in their statement of facts, appellants are
not altogether accurate in saying that the truck driYcr
''applied the brakes on several occasions and noted nothing unusual about the brakes". (R. 176, 177). As a matter
of fact, the defendant Knight stated on cross examination
that he could not say definitely whether he recalled applying the brakes after leaving the yard up until the time
of the accident. Previously he had testified that he had
not noticed anything unusual about the brakes, but on
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this 10-year-old Ford truck, it may have been usual for
the brakes to have been in bad condition. On cross examination, the defendant }(night testified that he did
not remember testing the brakes of the truck as he was
driving it in the yard on the morning of the accident, and
for all he knew at the trial or knew at the time of the
collision, the brakes on the truck could have been defective
before he took it out of the yard. (R. 181). In view of this,
appellants' claim that the defendant applied his brakes
on several occasions and noted nothing unusual about
the brakes was both inaccurate and misleading.
In the case of Ala,rid v. Vanier (Cal.), 317 P.2d 110,
quoted by appellants in their brief, the following facts
appear:
''The brakes had worked perfectly on numerous occasions during the 10 miles traversed up to
the point of the accident. The traffic was heavy
and the driver could not turn out of his lane,
either to the right or to the left.''
In that case, the driver saw the plaintiff's car before
he applied the brakes. Much differently in the case at bar,
the defendant Knight did not remember testing the brakes
of the truck as he was driving it in the yard on the morning of the accident, nor did he recall using the brake at
any time on the road prior to the accident; and for all
he knew, the brakes on the truck could have been defective
before he ever took the truck out of the yard. Furthermore, he did not see the plaintiff's truck (it had been
stopped for approximately 30 seconds in the left-turn

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lane) until the actual impact occurred. In the case at bar,
there was nothing to prevent the defendant Knight from
turning to the right to avoid hitting plaintiff's truck when
his brakes failed, and if he started to apply the brakes
when the light changed red, as his testimony seems to
indicate, he had 30 seconds within which time to avoid
running into the back of plaintiff's truck. The defendant
Knight could not even explain his presence in the lane
reserved for left turn only, and for all that appears in
the record, he could have intended to continue easterly
on 21st South, except for the collision which resulted
from a combination of his defective brakes and extraordinary lack of attention to his driving.
It must be remembered that the condition of the
brakes on defendants' 10-year-old truck was a matter
peculiarly within their knowledge, and even if the selfserving claim that the brakes suddenly failed was altogether true, there was no testimony given as to the
actual condition of the brakes on the morning of the
collision or as to why they failed; and the fact that the
driver pumped them indicates some previous awareness
of their defective condition.
On a later opinion rendered in the case ofAlarid v.
V a;n,ier, 327 P.2d 897, the California Court stated:
''In our opinion, the correct test is whether
the person who has violated a statute has sustained the burden of showing that he did what
might reasonably be expected of a person of
ordinary intelligence, acting under similar rircumstances, who desired to comply with the
law.''
20
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The later decision repudiates in part the earlier
decision cited by the appellants, although it arrived at the
same result, and after citing the California statute with
respect to brakes, which is comparable to our own, the
California Court in the ALARID case made this further
statement:
''The presumption of negligence which arises
from the violation of a statute is rebuttable and
may be overcome by evidence of justification or
excuse .... There is no evidence of contributory
negligence and, since it is clear from defendant's
admission that the failure of his brakes was a
proximate cause of the accident, it follows that the
defendant would be liable as a ma.tter of la;w in the
absence of a sufficient excuse or justification for
violation of the code.
''A large number of cases, although varying
considerably in the language used, stand generally for the proposition that where a person has
disobeyed a statute he may excuse or justify the
violation by evidence that he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances who desired to
comply with the standard of conduct established
by thestatute. (Citing numerous cases)''
Section 41-6-144, Utah Code Annotated (1953), provides, among other things, as follows :
''Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle
or motor-driven cycle when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to
control the movement of and to stop and hold such
vehicle, including two separate means of applying thee brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels.
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If these two separate means of applying the
brakes arc connected in any way, they shall be so
constructed that failure of any one part of the
operating mechanism shall not leave the motor
vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels."
The statute then proceeds to describe the requirements for the performance ability of brakes, etc.
It is obvious in the case at bar that the brakes upon
the defendants' truck did not comply with the statutory
requirements and, under the weight of authority, the
defendants' operation of the truck with defective brakes
in violation of statute constituted negligence per se.
8 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 702, states :
"In most states there are statutes which set
forth specific requirements as to brakes on motor
vehicles. Before a motorist can be charged with
negligence by reason of the violation of a statute
relating to brakes, it must first of all be established
as a fact that there was a violation. Where the
violation of a statute containing specific requirements as to brakes is established, most authorities support the fact that such violation constitutes negligence per se. Under such a fact, where
the motorist has done all that can be reasonably
expected of a person of ordinary prudence to see
that a vehicle is in proper condition, and an unforeseen failure of the brakes occurs, he is not
usually held guilty of negligence as a matter of
law.
"In a number of jurisdictions, the violation
of a statute relating to brakes is merelv evidence
of negligence or makes only a prima fa~ie case of
negligence. Thus, a motorist's Yiolation of a stat22
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ute requiring his vehicle to be equipped with adequate brakes in good working order, and sufficient
to control the vehicle at all times, does not conclusively establish negligence on his part. He may
defend by sho'''ing proper inspection and a sudden
failure of brakes without warning; thus showing
that he did not know and was not chargeable with
knowledge of the defective brakes. On the other
hand, where it is in fact shown that he had knowledge of the defective condition of his brakes, or
that he would have known of their condjtion if he
had made reasonable tests, he is not excused from
liability.''
JicCoy v. Courtney (Wash.), 172 P.2d 596 at P.601,
states that:

''Under the first of these statutes it was the
positive duty of the respondents to have their
automobile equipped \Yith brakes capable of holding the vehicle on any plus or minus grade upon
which it is to be operated, and a violation of that
standard would constitute negligence per se. Jacklin v. North Coast Transportation. CompG!Yly, 165
Wash. 236, 5 P .2d 325.''
Whether the rule of negligence per se, presumption
of negligence, or whether the California rule that a person who has violated the statute must sustain the burden
of showing that he did what might be reasonably expected
of a person of ordinary intelligence acting under similar
circumstances who desired to comply \vith the la-vv;
whether this court accepts any of these rules, the defendants failed miserably and completely to explain or
excuse their violation of the statute. In the first place,
there is no direct evidence that the defendant ever applied
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If these two separate means of applying the
brakes arc connected in any way, they shall be so
constructed that failure of any one part of the
operating mechanism shall not leave the motor
vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels."
The statute then proceeds to describe the requirements for the performance ability of brakes, etc.
It is obvious in the case at bar that the brakes upon
the defendants' truck did not comply with the statutory
requirements and, under the weight of authority, the
defendants' operation of the truck with defective brakes
in violation of statute constituted negligence per se.
8 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 702, states :
"In most states there are statutes which set
forth specific requirements as to brakes on motor
vehicles. Before a motorist can be charged with
negligence by reason of the violation of a statute
relating to brakes, it must first of all be established
as a fact that there was a violation. \Vhere the
violation of a statute containing specific requirements as to brakes is established, most authorities support the fact that such violation constitutes negligence per se. li nder such a fact, \Yhere
the motorist has done all that can be reasonably
expected of a person of ordinar~~ prudence to see
that a vehicle is in proper condition, and an unforeseen failure of the brakes occurs, he is not
usually held guilty of negligence as a rna tter of
law.
"In a number of jurisdictions, the violation
of a statute relating to brakes is merely evidence
of negligence or makes only a prima facie case of
negligence. Thus, a motorist's Yiolation of a stat22
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ute requiring his vehicle to be equipped "·ith adequate brakes in good working order, and sufficient
to control the vehicle at all times, does not conclusively establish negligence on his part. He may
(lPfend by showing proper inspection and a sudden
failure of brakes without warning; thus showing
that he did not know and was not chargeable with
knowledge of the defective brakes. On the other
hand, where it is in fact shown that he had knowledge of the defective condition of his brakes, or
that he would have known of their condj tion if he
had made reasonable tests, he is not excused from
liability.''
JicCoy v. Courtney (Wash.), 172 P.2d 596 at P.601,
states that:

"Under the first of these statutes it was the
positive duty of the respondents to have their
automobile equipped with brakes capable of holding the vehicle on any plus or minus grade upon
which it is to be operated, and a violation of that
standard would constitute negligence per se. Jacklin. v. North Coast Transportation. Company, 165
Wash. 236, 5 P .2d 325.''
Whether the rule of negligence per se, presumption
of negligence, or whether the California rule that a person who has violated the statute must sustain the burden
of showing that he did what might be reasonably expected
of a person of ordinary intelligence acting under similar
circumstances who desired to comply with the law;
whether this court accepts any of these rules, the defendants failed miserably and completely to explain or
excuse their violation of the statute. In the first place,
there is no direct evidence that the defendant ever applied
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the brakes or tested the brakes prior to the time when
it was claimed they suddenly failed, notwithstanding the
fact that this was a 10-year-old truck which was used
only when newer trucks were not available, and it is
rather common knowledge that as trucks get older, brakes
get poorer unless they are adequately serviced, inspected,
and maintained.
A weak attempt was made by the defendants to show
brake inspection and maintenance, and for this purpose
they called the witness Staley, who claimed to have made
an adjustment of the brakes on the defendant's truck
some seven or eight weeks prior to the day of the colli..:
sion, and there was no subsequent inspection or service.
On cross examination, he admitted that he took only 20
minutes on just a superficial adjustment of what brake
was there. He did not take the brake down to inspect the
lining; he did not know what condition the brakes were
in at the time he made the adjustment in July, and although he claimed the lining was good in l\Ia:T, 1960, he
could not recall to what extent the lining had been worn.
Could any reasonable person conclude from such evidence
that the defendants exercised ordinary care to inspect
the brakes on the defendants' 10-year-old truck or to
maintain them in the operating condition required by the
statute?
They did n.ot excuse non-compliance with the statute:
they did not rebut the presumption of negligence; they
did not sustain the burden of showing that thev did what
might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary
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intelligence, who desired to comply with the law. The
question of the defendants' negligence with respect to
the failure of the brakes, therefore, became a matter of
law which was correctly determined by the trial court
as there was nothing upon which the jury, acting reasonably, could have based a finding showing that the defendants discharge their statutory duty with respect to
adequate brakes.
It is generally understood by those who operate and
maintain motor vehicles that brakes do wear out and
become less efficient with prolonged use, and as the
brakes wear, 20-minute brake adjustments become less
effectual in establishing a brake condition that 'will last
for as long as 8 weeks. There is no testimony in the record
of any kind that the brakes on this particular truck were
inspected, serviced, checked, or found to be satisfactory
during any part of the period of time which intervened
between the 20-minute adjustment in early July and the
pumping of an ineffectual brake on the 31st of August.
Furthermore, the record shows that the defendant
was not maintaining a proper lookout. It will be recalled
that the plaintiff had been stopped in the left-turn lane
for approximately 30 seconds waiting for the red light
to change, during which time he was constantly delivering
to vehicles behind him an electrical left-turn signal., If,
as the defendant Knight claimed, he was prompted to put
on his brake by the light turning red, he had approximately 30 seconds within which to determine that his
brakes weren't going to work and to take other responsi-
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ble action to aYoid colliding with the plaintiff who had
been in a station&ry position for approximately 30 seconds. According to the defendant l(night 's testimony,
there were no vehicles in the two lanes of traffic to the
right of the plaintiff which would have prevented his
swerving to the right if he had seen the plaintiff's parked
vehicle before the moment of impact. It is crystal clear
that the jurors could not have possibly found that the
plaintiff was other than negligent in maintaining a
proper lookout and in operating a vehicle without adequate brakes in violation of this statute. The defendant
did not know where he was going and could not explain
his presence in the left-turn only lane. There "\vas no
dispute in the evidence nor was there a question of proximate cause, nor one of contributory negligence which
would have warranted the trial court in submitting
those issues to the jury.
The case of Lockmoellcr v. K eil, 137 S.\~r. 2d 625
( l\Io.) cited by the appellaltns is not in point, for in that
case the vehicle in question had brakes, contemplated
by the statute, which had been adjusted a week before
the accident, and the brakes had been used a block east
of the impact and had worked properly, and there appeared to be no evidence of inattention or failure to maintain a lookout in that case as well.
Similarly distinguishable from the case at bar is
Trudeau v. Fril!a Construction Company, 62 N .\\~. 2d
492 (Minn.), cited hy the appellants, in which the brakes
had previously functioned properly and had been re26
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paired two ·weeks before the accident, and in that rase
there was no evidence of failure to maintain a proper
lookout.
The case of Eddy v. illcAnincll, 347 P.2d 499 (Colo.),
does not sustain the appellants' position in the case at
bar as that court held that the accident resulted from
causes beyond the control of the defendant.
In the case of Best v. 1-Iuber, 3 U. 2d 177, 281 P.2c1
208, (Utah), cited by the appellants, the Court said:
'' ... Because of her self interest and a consideration of the improbability of a sudden and
complete failure of brakes, which are in good
working order, the jury might have disbelieved
this portion of her testimony. Additionally, the
fact that she says that she pumped the brakes two
or three times in the instant between the claimed
brake failure and the crash suggests that she
knew of at least a weakness in the brakes . . .
''Plaintiff here produced evidence that there
was adequate room on the street for the defendant to have turned to the right to avoid the accident. Defendant herself testified that the hand
brake was in good working order, but she made no
attempt to use it or to turn aside. The jury, from
the undisputed facts, could have found her negligent in either of these particulars; under a general instruction of due care, could have found her
negligent in failing to apply the foot brakes within a reasonable distance from the automobile she
was approaching.''
The matter of the defendants' negligence as a matter
of law was not raised in that case as the jury had re-
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solved the question
plaintiff.

of negligence 1n favor of the

Finally, the appellant should take no comfort from
the rule of Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 108 So. 409
(Miss.), cited by the appellants. In that case, the evidence
showed that the truck had been inspected on April 26,
1956, on May 5, 1956, and on J\1ay 12, 1956, and the accident occurred on May 15, 1956. The J\1ay 12th inspection
showed that the truck needed no repairs or attention
of any kind. The brakes had been inspected three days
before the accident and seemed to be ein proper condition and were working properly before the accident and
during the early morning of the accident. The driver had
made several stops only a short time before the accident
occurred and had experienced no difficulty in the brakes.
Moreover, there was evidence which justified the jury in
finding that the plaintiff was not even injured in that
case. It occurs to us the only use that could be made of
the Phillips v. Delta case is that the brakes on a commercial truck ought to be inspected about every week; at any
rate, the weekly inspections in that case may be indicative of what should have been done in the case at bar.
There is certainly no parallel in the facts.
We desire to call the Court's attention to the case
of Sothoron v. West, (l\1d.) 26 A.2d 16. In that case, the
Court had given judgment for the defendant, and the case
was reversed and judgment entered in fayor of the plaintiff because the appellate court held that there ·was neo-e.
ligence as a matter of law. The Court stated as follows:
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" 'It is the duty of one operating a motor vehicle on the public highway to see that it is in reasonably good condition and properly equipped so
that it may be at all times controlled and not become a source of danger.' Huddy Automobile Law,
"In Blashfield's Cyclopedia ·.of Automobile
Law and Practice, Perm. Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 2, Sec.
826, it is said: 'One operating an automobile on
the streets or highways is bound to take notice
that he may be called upon to make emergency
stops, and even in the absence of express regulation, the driver is required, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have his car equipped with brakes
in such good condition that they can, by the use
thereof, aid in stopping the car or controlling the
speed of the car.'
''In ::\Iaryland we have the express regulation
contained in Article 56, Sec. 194 (1), ·which reads:
'Every motor vehicle, except trailers and side cars,
while in use on the public highways of this state,
shall be provided with adequate brakes.'
"In some states having similar statutes, it has
been held that driving ·with defcetive brakes is
negligence per se. (See William Harden, Inc. v.
Harden, 1940, 29 Ala., App. 411, 197 So. 94; !(ampee Grocery Co. v. Sauls, 1928, 38 Ga. App. 487,
144 S.E. 403.)
''The better and more general rule seems to be
that failure of brakes to operate makes only a
prima facie case which the driver may defend by
showing proper inspections and a sudden failure
without 'Yarning. (Citing cases) ...
"The kind of inspection required is stated in
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Negligence, Paragraph 300, at comment (C. Inspection), as that:
' ... which a reasonable man should recognize as
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necessary.' It is also said, 'The actor's negligence lies in his act of using the defectiYr instrument without adequate inspection, not in his omission to perform his dnt:T of inspection.'
''The appellate offered as an excuse for the
accident the fact that her brakes would not hold.
She offered no evidence of any inspection. She
testified to a drive which carried her through a
number of city blocks and intersections. It is
almost inconceivable that during the course of
such a drive she did not at some time or other
have occasion to use the foot brake. Her testimony, however, negatives this. The question before us, therefore, is ·whether the fact that her
brakes suddenly failed her excuses her from the
charge of negligence, when she has driYen a number of city blocks without making the slightest
test of these brakes, and their first use in the
descent of a steep hill where she has to rely on
them for her safety and for the safety of the other
occupants of the highway.
''We do not think the appellee is excused ..
This is not the case of a latent defect ·which could
not have been discovered. A person driving a
strange car for the first time owes a duty to the
public to see that there are no obvious defects in
its mechanism which are apt to cause injury to
others. Defective brakes are obvious because they
ran be detected by the simple pressure of the foot.
The test is so simple that anyone can make it. If
such a test shows the brakes in working order and
then they suddenly fail, the driver mav not be
liable for negligence in driving with the~. If no
test is made, if the brakes are not even tried the
. cannot rely on a presumption that the ' madnver
chine is safe. He will not be excused from liability for the destruction he may cause upon the
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public highway because he did not know his brakes
were bad.
''For the reasons stated, the judgment will be
reversed, and in accordance with the rule, a judgment will be entered for the appellant against
the appellee for $123.55 with interest from the
date of trial and costs here and below.''
Similarly, in the case at bar there is no evidence
that the defendant driver so much as applied his brakes
on the morning of the accident ·while traversing the distance from his point of origin to the place of collision
with the plaintiff, and even if \YC should apply the prima
facie negligency rule rather than the more general rule
of negligence per se, the Sothoron case is authority for
the fact that the appellant in this case was negligent as
a matter of law.
In Nettleton v. James, (Ore.) 319 P.2d 879, it was
held that a violation of statute with respect to adequate
brakes is negligence as a matter of law. \V e quote from
the decision as follows:
''By unbroken line of decisions of this court,
violation of a statute commanding a certain duty
is negligencee in and of itself ... The rule was
applied by this court in a case involving the adequacy of brakes and an instruction that violation
of the statute was negligence per se was approved ...
''The weight of authority supports the fact
that violation by the driver or owner of an automobile of a statute containing specific regulations
as to brakes is negligence per se. Annotation 170,
ALR 611, 661, and cases there cited. 3-A Am. J ur.
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We further quote from this decision at p. 884:
" ... We think that it is one thing to say that
a driver who, without fault on his part, skids over
to the left side of the road, has not viola ted the
law which requires motorists to keep to the right
(for how could it be allowed that any such application of the statute was intended
but quite a
different thing to hold that, when the legislature
declared that motor vehicles must be equipped
with two sets of adequate brakes which shall be
maintained in good working order, the statute was
only intended to apply if the driver did not know,
or had no reason to believe, that his brakes were
insufficient ....

n;

"It may be that where an accident is caused
solely by latent defects in materials employed in
construction of the braking system which the
usual and well recognized tests afforded by science
and art for the purpose failed to detect, the owner
or operator of an automobile should not be held
responsible . . ., but there is no evidence in this
case of latent defects and that question need not
be decided.''
Another case very similar to the case at bar is AllJers
v. Ottenbacher (S. D. 1962), 116 N.\V. 2d 529. In that
case, the jury found against the plaintiff on the issue of
liability and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the failure of the defendant to comply \Yith the statute with
respect to maintenance of safe braking equipment constituted negligence as a matter of law. The appellant
court so ruled, reversing the verdict and holding the
defendant negligent as a matter of law.
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In that case, the defendant testified that he had experienced no difficulty with his brakes in traversing the
distance from his place of residence to the scene of the
accident until his attempted stop to avoid the collision.
He further stated that he started to slow his speed when
he saw the light change and eased up behind the plaintiff's car; that when he applied the foot brake it failed,
and he attempted to pump the brake.
We quote from the decision as follows :
''Defendant was required by the provisions of
this statute to have his car equipped with brakes
adequate to control the movement of and to stop
and hold the vehicle and maintained in good working order. Defendant admittedly was operating
his car with defective foot brakes and in violation
of the statute. The question presented is whether
the violation by the defendant of the statutee containing speceific requirements as to brakes constitues negligence as a matter of law or whether the
jury, under the facts and circumstancesfi could
find that defendant ·was not negligent ....
"It may thus be said that when the driver or
owner of a motor vehicle violates the specific regulations as to brakes contained in Sec. 44.0346
supra, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of
law unless it appears that compliance was excusable because of circumstances resulting from
causes beyond his control and not produced by his
own misconduct. Evidence of due care does not
furnish an excuse or justification. The court in
Bush v. Harvey Transfer Company, supra, points
out the dnfference: 'Since the failure to comply
with ... safety statute constitutes negligence per
se, a party guilty of the violation of such a statute
33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot excuse himself from compliance by showing
that he did or attempted to do what any reasonable, prudent person would have done under the
same or similar circumstances. A legal excuse
must be something that would make it impossible
to comply with the statute.' To the same effect,
Florke v. Peterson, supra; Gallicotte v. California Mutual Building Loan Association, 4 Cal.,
App. 2d. 503, 41 P.2d 349."
The Court then cites with approval the case of
Nettleton v. James and the case of Sothoron v. TYest previously cited in this brief, and in reversing the trial
court made the further statement:
''The evidence as viewed most favorably to the
defendant was not sufficient to make a question of
legal excse one of fact for the jury. The violation
of the statute without legal excuse constituted negligence in itself, and the court erred in submitting
an issue of negligence to the jury."
POINT III
THE DAMAGES ESTABLISHED BY THE
JURY WERE NOT EXCESSIVE, \YERE
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
This question has been before this court on numerous occasions. We have reviewed all the cases cited by
the appellants in their brief and have no quarrel with
the principles set forth in those decisions.
In the case of Pauly v. ll!lcC'artl!y, 109 lTtah 431,
184 P.2d 123 (1947), cited hy the appellants, the Court
stated as follows:
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"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P.2d 865. The present
cost of living and the diminished purchasing
power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when considering damages. Coke v. Timby,
57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.''
In that case, the trial court remanded the net jury
verdict of $50,000.00 to $35,000.00. The defendants not
being satisfied with the remittitur appealed, claiming that
the verdict was based on passion and prejudice. There
\Yas evidence of permanent back injury in that case.
The trial court has considerable discretion in the
allowance or rejection of a motion for new trial based
upon exceessive verdict.
In the case of Eleg(J;nti v. Standard Coal ComJJally,
50 Utah 585, 168 Pac. 266, also cited by the appellants,
Justice Frick, in refusing to disturb the action of the
trial court, said: (P. 269 of the Pac. Rept.)
'' . . . As pointed out in Jensen v. Denver &
Rio Grande eR. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1192,
1193, the power to grant new trials upon the
ground of excessive verdicts can rarely be exercised by this court, and the only power we ordinarily possess is to determine whether the trial
court has abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a new trial on that ground.''
In the case of llf orgarn v. Ogden Union Depot, 77
Utah 325, 294 Pac. 541, in refusing to disturb a verdict
sustained by the trial court, this court held :
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"The question has been before this ~ourt a
great number of times, and we have un1~ormly
held that we are permitted to interfere w1th the
verdict on this ground only when the facts are
such that the excess can be determined as a matter
of law, or that the verdict is so exceessive as to
shock one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the
jury, and that the trial court, in passing on the
question, clearly abused its discretion in permitting the verdict to stand. (Citing cases) ''
In the case of Paul v. Kirkendall, 123 Utah 627, 261
P. 2d 670 (1953), in refusing to disturb the verdict in that
case, which involved a $20,000.00 award for a back injury to the wife and loss of consortium, this court, speaking through Justice 1\fcDonough said :
''Appellant claims here that damages awarded
were so excessive as to appear prejudicial. Rule
59-A (5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that a new trial may be granted on grounds of excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. It is not enough, under this rule, nor nor
under the code provision which it supplanted,
merely to allege that the amount is exceessive. The
amount of the verdict is ordinarily a matter exclusively for the jury, and on the ground of adequacy of the verdict alone the court may not interfere with the jury's verdict unless it clearlY
appears that the award was rendered under mi~
understanding or prejudice .... Therefore, in reviewing the trial court's ruling denying the defendant's motion for new trial on grounds of
excesesiveness of damages awarded by the jury's
verdict, this court is limited to a determination
of whether such ruling was an abuse of discre36
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tion. The Supreme Court is slow to interfere with
a trial court's ruling granting or refusing a new
trial on questions relating to damages. Hirabelli
v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 Pac. 1172; Shatelan
v. rrhackeray, 98 Utah 525 100 P. 2d 191. The question here on appeal, then, is a determination of
whether the damages awarded bear no proper
relation to the wrong suffered as shown by the
evidence and in accordance with the instructions
of the Court, so that this Court may exercise its
power to set aside the verdict of the jury.''
Again we have no quarrel with the principle discussed by this court in the more recent case of Stamp Y.
Union Pacific Ra.ilroad Co., 5 U. 2d 387, 303 P. 2d 279,
in which the court ordered a remittitur of the Yerdict
from $10,000.00 to $6,000. That case involved a temporary eye injury with no permanent impairment of
vision, and the court was of the opinion that the award
made by the jury had no basis in fact and was so excessive
as to shock the conscience and to clearly indicate passion
and prejudice. In his specially concurring opinion, Justice Crockett made this pertinent observation:
''The first such rule is that courts should exercise great caution and forebearance in disturbing
jury verdicts to the end that the important right
of trial by jury is preserved. :Moreover, after the
lower court has given its approval to the award hy
refusing to set aside or modify the verdict, that
much additional validity is thereby conferred upon
it, and the appellate court, a fortiori, should be
more reluctant to interfere with the jury verdict
and the judgment of the court because of their
advantaged position in having a first-hand view
of the proceedings and will do so only when to per37
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mit it to stand would work a manifest injustice.
(Citing cases.) ''
To briefly summarize the points discussed by the
Utah decisions, it would appear that: (1) The appellate
court should interfere with the verdict only when the facts
are such that the excess can be determined as a matter of
law; or (2) that the verdict is so excessive as to shock
one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury; (3) that the
trial court, in passing on the question, clearly abused its
discretion in permitting the verdict to stand ; ( 4) the fact
that the trial court has given its approval to the verdict
should dispose the appellant court to be more reluctant in
disturbing the verdict because of the "advantaged position'' of the trial court in having a first-hand vie\\- of
the proceedings; unless failure to interfere by the appellate court would permit a manifest injustice; (5) that
there should be a proper relationship between the verdict
and the wrong suffered as disclosed by the evidence, indicating that the jury faithfully followed the court's
instructions.
We earnestly contend that the application of all of
these principles to the case at bar would result in the
affirmance of the verdict and of the action of the trial
court in denying the motion for new trial. \Y e have rather
extensively summarized the medical evidence and the evidence pertaining to plaintiff's injuries to assist the court
in arriving at this conclusion.
The plaintiff was 63 years of age and in the enjoy-
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ment of excellent health, for his age, never having suffered from any serious health problem prior to the time
of the accident. He was highly skilled in his vocation
as an automobile mechanic, and although \YC agree that
the X-ray pictures indicated arthritic degeneration in the
plaintiff's spine, which is generally true as an incident
to age, nevertheless the plaintiff had actively pursued his
vocation without restriction of activity for 40 years prior
to the collision, and although he owned his own garage
and had some administrative duties, he spent two-thirds
of his time ·working in overalls on the various repair jobs
that came to him. He stated that it was about a year
after the accident before he could do any car repair work
at all, and then his work was restricted to manual tuneup jobs which would not require him to get down under
a car. He further stated it is now impossible for him to
get under the dash of a car to fix any of the wires or
change the gauges because h ecan 't hold his head underneath. He cannot get under a car and take do\Yll a transmissiOn.
vVhen he was examined by Dr. Reese on September
19, 1960, Dr. Reese observed that he had a stiff and painful neck with limitation of motion ranging from 50 per
cent to 80 per cent, with definite muscle spasm, and Dr.
Reese testified that, in his opinion, the accident was
wholly and solely responsible for plaintiff's disability.
He further expressed the opinion that the disability waR
permanent.
Dr. Boyd Holbrook, the orthopedic specialist, testified that the plaintiff has suffered 50 per cent loss of mo-
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tion to the neck involving all movements of the neck, and
he evaluated plaintiff's permanent disability as 20 per
cent impairment of the body as a whole, which he stated
would impair plaintiff's ability to work as a mechanic.
Dr. Holbrook recommended surgery for fusion of the
cervical vertebrae involved, and recognizing the hazards
attendant upon such an operation, felt that if the operation was successful, plaintiff's permanent bodily disability would be reduced to 10 per cent, and he testified that
the reasonable cost of such an operation would be approximately $1,000. Dr. Holbrook stated that plaintiff's
permanent injury was the result of the collision and that
the factors creating the need for the operation of the
plaintiff "-ere caused by the collision.
There can be no question but what plaintiff sustained
a serious, painful, and disabling injury which will greatly
impair his ability to perform his work and his enjoyment
of life for as long as his life shall continue. Having
arrived at the age of 63 without any serious health problem and still pursuing an active and useful life, the jury
would have been fully justified in concluding that he had
a reasonable life expectancy of several years.
The amount of the verdict being fully justified by
the evidence, does not even remotely suggest passion or
prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury, and the
appellants have brought nothing to the attention of the
court, nor could they, which would justify this court in
reducing the verdict or granting the motion for new trial,
which the trial court, in the rea.sona ble exercise of its
judgment, sa-w fit to sustain. Certainly, as recognized by
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the previous decisions of this court, the jury was entitled
to take into account the present purchasing power of
money and the present conditions of inflation which
would make a present-day verdict worth only about a
third as much as a verdict in the same amount rendered
10 or 13 years ago; and these cases, so far as discussion
of the amounts involved are concerned, can be of little
assistance to the court in determining what is just and
proper today. However, for what it is worth, there is an
Illinois case decided in 1950 (some 13 years ago) in which
a $20,000.00 verdict was upheld for a whiplash injury to
a woman's neck in \Yhich the woman had received hospital care without surgery with continuing symptoms
similar to those involved in the case at bar. Smith v. Kroger Grocery arnd Baking Compatn,y (Illinois, 1950), Ill.
App. 501, 90 N.E. 2d 500.
We earnestly contend that under the evidence of injury in this case, fully substantiated by the doctors who
examined and treated the plaintiff, the jury would have
been altogether justified in allowing a verdict considerably greater than the one this court is asked to disturb.
The amount of the verdict does not shock the conscience,
nor does it indicate passion, prejudice, or a disregard of
eYidence or the Court's instructions.
CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly shows that the defendants were
guilty of negligence as a matter of law through operating
a motor vehicle on the highway with defective brakes and
in approaching the intersection of 21st South and State
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Street without maintaining a reasonable or proper lookout. The record discloses no evidence excusing the defendant's violation of his statutory duty with respect to
the maintenance of his braking equipment. The evidence
does not even show that the defendants exercised ordinary care in the maintenance of their braking equipment.
The trial court, therefore, had no proper alternative but
to withdraw the issue of negligence efrom the consideration of the jury.
If we should assume against the record that the court
erred in its instructions, the defendants failed to make a
timely or appropriate objection - indeed, they flatly
stated approval of the instructions given. The verdict
was not exces~sive and did not indicate passion or prejudice but was fully justified by the evidence.
The trial judge, having presided over the trial proceedings and having observed the witnesses, the parties,
and the jurors in the exercise of his sound judgment and
discretion denied the motion for new trial and refused to
disturb the verdict.
We therefore respectfully conclude that in accordance with the well-established principles of law and justice set forth in this brief, the verdict and judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW D. WHITE
351 So. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plarintiff
and Respondent
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